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The law regulates addiction in two primary ways: by limiting access 
to controlled substances and by criminal and civil law doctrines that 
pertain to addicts. The general ability of the state to legally regulate 
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potentially harmful commodities and behaviors, including by criminal 
law prohibitions and punishment, is an unquestionably justifiable exer-
cise of its police power authority to act for the benefit of public health, 
safety and welfare. The public policy issues are whether legal regulation 
is wise in a specific context and whether it may conflict with individual 
rights.
This chapter first addresses the basic definitional and conceptual 
issues concerning addiction that must be clarified to make progress. 
Then it turns to the justification of substance regulation in the USA and 
to the public policy issues themselves. The author suggests that the right 
to use substances recreationally, even at the risk of severe negative conse-
quences such as addiction, is weighty and that regulation of substances 
and addiction-related behavior by the criminal law is problematic. Next, 
the chapter considers whether addiction should be a mitigating or excus-
ing condition for crime and whether addicts can be involuntarily civilly 
committed. The current state of the law is described and it is proposed 
that, in most cases, addiction should not mitigate or excuse criminal 
offending and that addicts should not be civilly committed. A final sec-
tion briefly considers sensible social and criminal justice policies that 
could alleviate the costs of addiction, even if society does not decriminal-
ize drugs or excuse addicts.
CLARIFICATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT 
DRUGS AND ADDICTION
Virtually every statement that can be made about drugs and addic-
tion, whether it is factual or normative, is contestable. In this section, the 
author will try to remain as neutral as possible.
Despite common belief to the contrary, there is no consensual defini-
tion either of a drug, which is the most common cause of an addiction, 
or of addiction, but clarity about both is necessary to discuss legal regu-
lation sensibly. Let us start with the definition of a drug or a substance. 
Virtually all definitions are vague or overinclusive, permitting categori-
zation as a drug of almost any substance that may be consumed. Some 
definitions are circularly dependent on legal regulations. If a law regulat-
ing “drugs” includes a particular substance within its ambit, it is a drug 
or a “controlled substance”, that is, a substance that cannot be consumed 
except under limited conditions such as a physician’s prescription (Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 2010, Section 802(6)). If it is not so 
included, it is not a drug for legal purposes. Vague, overinclusive and 
circular definitions cannot sensibly guide public policy, especially when 
the state’s awesome power to blame and punish for illegitimate use is 
dependent on the definition.
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Definitional problems concerning drugs and regulation cannot be 
entirely avoided by using allegedly scientific or value-neutral medical/
therapeutic or nutritional concepts. Concepts such as disease and ther-
apy are themselves value laden and inevitably problematic and contro-
versial. Many substances that have unquestionably legitimate medical 
or nutritional uses can also be used for non-medical or non-nutritional 
purposes that may be of questionable legitimacy. Finally, definitions that 
define a substance as a drug in terms of its intended use rather than in 
terms of its inherent properties obscure important questions of legitimate 
use.
Despite the conceptual problems attending the definition of a drug, a 
loose but common-sense definition is possible for discussing addiction 
and regulation. This common-sense definition would be substances that 
can be consumed recreationally, that is, primarily to produce pleasure, 
whether or not those substances have other legitimate uses. For the pur-
pose of understanding the current debate about addiction and regula-
tion, recreational drugs can be defined as consumable substances that: (1) 
can affect mood, cognition and behavior in pleasurable ways; (2) can be 
used primarily for recreation, including relaxation, excitement and plea-
surable states generally; and (3) can be used so as to endanger the user 
and others. Although admittedly loose, this definition covers both legal 
recreational substances, such as ethanol (alcohol), nicotine and caffeine, 
and substances that are illegal either per se or if they are not properly 
prescribed by physicians, such as marijuana, cocaine, opiates, e.g., her-
oin, barbiturates, amphetamines, phencyclidine (PCP), and the like. Let 
us defer the definition of an addictive drug until we have considered the 
nature of addiction.
The primary criteria of addiction commonly employed at present are 
behavioral, namely, persistent drug seeking and using, especially com-
pulsively, in the face of negative consequences (Morse, 2009). The neural 
mechanisms of addiction are debatable, but are being intensively inves-
tigated and will probably be uncovered (Hyman, 2007), and environ-
mental variables play an important role in explaining addictive behavior 
(Kalant, 2010).
The most important terms for legal purposes are “compulsive” and 
“negative consequences”. There is no gold-standard definition of or psy-
chological or biological test for compulsivity, which also must be demon-
strated behaviorally. There are extremely suggestive laboratory findings, 
especially with non-human animals (e.g. Everitt & Robbins, 2005), but 
none is yet diagnostic for humans. The usual behavioral criteria for com-
pulsion are both subjective and objective. Addicts commonly report feel-
ings of craving or that they have lost control or cannot help themselves. 
If the agent persists in seeking and using despite ruinous medical, social 
and legal consequences, and despite an alleged desire to stop, we infer 
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based on common sense that the person must be acting under compul-
sion. It seems that there is no other way to explain the behavior, but it 
is not based on rigorous tests of a well-validated concept. Negative con-
sequences, both internalities and externalities, are not necessarily part of 
the definition of addiction because, depending on the circumstances, it is 
possible to be a highly functioning addict who does not suffer or impose 
substantial negative consequences. Contingent social norms and expecta-
tions play a role in explaining how negative the consequences must be, 
but addiction often has severely negative consequences (e.g. overdose, 
cancer, psychosis), independent of social norms and expectations.
There are many findings about the biology and psychology of addicts 
that differentiate this group from non-addicts, but none of these find-
ings is independently diagnostic. Addiction must be demonstrated 
behaviorally. Although the characterization of addiction as a “chronic 
and relapsing brain disease” is widely used today, it is not justified by 
the data (Heyman, 2009). Brain causation and brain differences do not 
per se make associated behaviors the signs or symptoms of a disease. 
All behavior has brain causes and one would expect brain differences 
between any two groups exhibiting different behaviors. Moreover, the 
relapse data were not gathered on random samples of addicts, and char-
acterizing a return to maladaptive behavior as a “relapse” begs the ques-
tion of whether the behavior is the sign or a symptom of a disease. The 
latter must be proven independently (Fingarette & Hasse, 1979). Whether 
addiction should be considered a disease, a moral failure, or sometimes 
both, is still an open question. Even if addicts have difficulty controlling 
their behavior, they are not zombies or automatons; they act intention-
ally to satisfy their desire to seek and to use drugs (Hyman, 2007; Morse, 
2000, 2007, 2009).
Using the definition just provided, an addictive drug would be one 
that has a substantial potential to cause users to persistently seek and 
use the substance, especially compulsively and with negative conse-
quences. Most users of even the most allegedly addictive substances do 
not become addicts, but some substances increase the risk. And, as noted, 
whether one moves from casual recreational use or medical use to addic-
tion is influenced by the agent’s set (psychological expectations) and by 
the setting (the environment and its cues) (Zinberg, 1986). The substance 
itself does not account for all the variance in explaining addiction. We 
would like to think, and it is probably true, that some substances are par-
ticularly addictive, holding the agent’s set and setting constant, but it is 
extremely difficult empirically to disentangle these causal variables.
A fascinating, fraught question is whether addiction should be lim-
ited to substances. After all, large numbers of people engage persistently 
and apparently compulsively in various activities, often at quite negative 
costs. Gambling is the most obvious example. If there are some activities 
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or non-drug substances that can produce the same “addictive behavior” 
and negative consequences as drugs, then legal regulation should per-
haps be similar by analogy. The author believes for many reasons that 
the concept of addiction should be expanded beyond drugs, but the anal-
ysis in this chapter will be confined to drug-related addictions.
THE JUSTIFICATION FOR LEGAL REGULATION: THE 
HARM PRINCIPLE AND ITS LIMITS
The general justification for the legal regulation of addictive sub-
stances is best summed up in the preamble to the Federal Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act:
The Congress makes the following findings and declarations:
(1) Many of the drugs included within this subchapter have a useful and legiti-
mate medical purpose and are necessary to maintain the health and general wel-
fare of the American people.
(2) The illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, and possession and 
improper use of controlled substances have a substantial and detrimental effect 
on the health and general welfare of the American people. (2010, Sections 
801(1) & (2)).
Just so. Who would deny that drugs can have beneficial effects, that 
some recreational (and medical) drug use leads to addiction, and that 
addicts often harm themselves and others? Even those recreational, 
“uncontrolled” addictive drugs that are legal to import, manufacture, 
distribute, possess, and use, such as nicotine and ethanol, are heav-
ily regulated and violations of those regulations are often criminalized. 
Few people object to civil regulation of potentially dangerous substances, 
such as laws concerning safe manufacture, taxation and public use. The 
real debate among all but the most libertarian theorists is therefore about 
the use of criminal law to prevent people from having unauthorized 
access to controlled substances (Husak, 2008). Therefore, this discussion 
will be limited to that topic, although it is clear that both nicotine and 
ethanol use create vast internalities and externalities.
The state’s police power to apprehend, prosecute, convict and punish 
citizens is the most awesome and afflictive power it exercises. Infliction 
of such pain requires substantial justification in liberal democracies that 
seek to protect individual rights and liberty. Afflictive and expensive 
criminal regulation should be avoided in favor of less intrusive means 
unless the harm is great, punishment would be deserved for causing it, 
and criminal prohibition seems necessary to reduce the level of harm 
and will not unduly impose on other important interests. Criminal law 
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theorists term these limitations on the state’s power to criminalize the 
“harm principle” (Feinberg, 1984). For example, intentionally inflicting 
emotional cruelty on others is morally despicable, but such behavior is 
not criminalized because the harm is insufficient to justify criminal pun-
ishment. Socialization by families, religious organizations and schools is 
reasonably effective to limit such conduct, and regulating such behavior 
by criminal law might intrude on protected liberties, such as the right to 
free speech.
There is little debate about the state’s justification for prohibiting and 
punishing traditional crimes against the person, such as homicide and 
forcible rape, and against property, such as theft and arson, that cause 
grievous harm. Although individual liberties are precious, no citizen 
has a right to kill, rape, steal or burn the property of others for private 
advantage, and the criminal sanction seems morally appropriate and 
necessary to curb such behavior. Societies can disagree about the scope of 
appropriate criminalization. For example, there may be reasonable dis-
pute about how much creation of homicidal risk should be necessary to 
warrant criminal penalties in addition to civil damages or how severely 
arson should be punished, but the state’s power to criminalize great 
harm to others is uncontroversial.
The harm principle suggests caution before criminalization, however, 
under the following conditions: when the harm is primarily inflicted on 
oneself; when the harm is primarily moral and not physical, psychologi-
cal or economic; when using criminal law to prevent the harm appears to 
intrude on important rights; or when criminalization appears unneces-
sary to effectively reduce the harmful behavior. In liberal societies, the 
right of the state to criminally prohibit actions that harm primarily the 
actor (so-called legal paternalism or legal moralism) is more controver-
sial than the right to prohibit harm to others. Respect for individual lib-
erty and autonomy generally entails that citizens have greater liberty to 
harm themselves than to harm others (Feinberg, 1986, 1988). Such liberty 
is arguably most extensive and the state’s right to regulate criminally 
most questionable when the threatened harm to self is apparently solely 
moral and no other harm to self or to others can be discerned. Most lib-
eral theorists reject the state’s power to use criminal law solely for the 
purpose of enhancing the moral perfection of its citizens. Such goals are 
arguably not the business of the state and should be achieved by other, 
less intrusive means.
Even within liberal regimes, the permissible scope of paternalism and 
moralism may vary, although both require more substantial justification 
than criminalizing harm to others. Consideration of the state’s justifi-
able use of criminal law to regulate recreational drug use because it may 
lead to addiction, however, must attend to the appropriate limits of state 
power within a particular political regime. The remainder of this chapter 
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assumes that the regime considering its policies concerning drugs and 
addiction is liberal.
DRUG USE AND RIGHTS
It is often assumed that there is no right, no liberty interest to use 
drugs recreationally, and, consequently, that the state has appropriate 
authority to use criminal law to prevent such use. Such an assumption 
is seldom supported with cogent argument, however, and it is not easy 
to give compelling moral and political reasons for rejecting such a right, 
even if exercise of that right may sometimes lead to ruinous addiction 
(Husak, 1992).
Sensible discussion must begin with the recognition that people take 
drugs recreationally because they desire the pleasurable effects produced 
by consuming substances that alter mood and cognition. It seems clear, 
however, that the state has no justifiable interest in criminal prohibition 
simply because the primary or even sole goal of behavior is pleasure or 
because the behavior involves consumption of a substance that can alter 
mood or cognition. Many people might consider it wrong to engage in 
activities solely for pleasure, especially if alteration of mood and cogni-
tion were involved and there were some danger of dependence on the 
activity, but a liberal society does not interfere with a citizen’s right to 
make autonomous choices to engage in such potentially dangerous activ-
ities. Citizens surely have a prima facie right to seek pleasure for its own 
sake, and it is very difficult to imagine a secular, liberal argument sug-
gesting that such a goal is immoral or harmful per se, even if some dan-
ger might sometimes be involved.
For example, suppose that a citizen engages in meditation solely for 
recreational purposes. No persuasive liberal moral or political theory 
would justify criminal prohibition of meditation, even if some citizens 
became dependent on meditating. Recreational drug use involves the 
consumption of a substance, but it is hard to imagine why the source of 
the recreation alone should make a difference. Currently illegal drugs 
produce pleasure by altering mood and cognition, but so do many legal 
activities, including meditation, mountain climbing, riding motorcycles, 
playing bridge, and the consumption of legal drugs such as caffeine, eth-
anol and nicotine. The state’s right to criminalize alterations of mood and 
cognition per se is questionable because such alterations are not per se 
immoral or harmful.
Citizens appear to have a prima facie right to engage in recreational 
alteration of mood and cognition by drug consumption and the state 
surely has the burden of justifying criminal prohibition of such recreation 
by powerful arguments. No right is absolute, however, and the possible 
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right to pursue recreational drug use must yield to a powerful state inter-
est in preventing such use, especially the undoubted state interest in cur-
tailing the threat that drugs will cause substantial harm by producing 
addiction, drug-related harms and their associated costs. Nonetheless, 
harm limitation counsels caution before using the criminal law.
Illegal drug use is often considered a “crime without a victim” 
because the person potentially most harmed—the user—in effect con-
sents to the threat. Indeed, virtually no recreational user, including those 
who begin use in adolescence, is unaware of the risk of addiction. Of 
course, younger people often tend to be foolish risk takers who do not 
sufficiently appreciate potential dangers and anyone can be in denial 
about the risks to him or herself. However, everyone is at least intellec-
tually aware of the risk that use may lead to addiction and that virtu-
ally no action affects only the agent. As a result of its effect on mental 
states and of its potential to produce addiction, recreational drug use 
sometimes threatens families and communities with economic, psycho-
logical and physical harms. Many of these harms may be paradoxically 
produced or enhanced by criminal prohibition itself, but many surely are 
not. Moreover, harms one consents to suffer are nonetheless harms. The 
question is whether the harms to others or to self that drugs produce are 
sufficient to trump the individual’s prima facie right to use drugs and 
thus to warrant criminalization of drug use.
The next section on cost–benefit analysis considers the harms drugs 
produce, but liberal societies often permit dangerous behavior in order 
to protect the right of citizens to pursue their own visions of how life 
should be led. Such dangerous behavior is regulated non-criminally, 
if at all. For example, consider the immense costs to many users and to 
society at large that flow from the consumption of ethanol and nicotine. 
Again, the state can appropriately regulate many aspects of such sub-
stance consumption to reduce the consequent harms, including the use 
of criminal law for egregiously harmful forms of misuse, such as drunk-
driving. For many reasons, however, importantly including the right 
to make one’s own choices unencumbered by undue state interference, 
criminal prohibition of the consumption of ethanol and nicotine by the 
state is considered unwarranted and the attempt to prohibit the former 
in the USA was a failed social policy, although it admittedly produced 
some health benefits.
If drugs produce great harms and no one has a right to use drugs rec-
reationally, or if that right is insubstantial at best, then the only question 
for analysis is whether criminal regulation is justified by the benefits 
it achieves. However, if there is a weighty liberty interest in making 
choices about how to live one’s life, including potentially unwise and 
dangerous choices about drugs, then the potential creation of harm is 
insufficient per se to warrant criminalization. Some dangerous behaviors 
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must be permitted to protect liberty and must be regulated primarily civ-
illy, including money damages and other impositions when addiction 
produces externalities. Any adequate analysis of the regulation of drug 
use by criminal law must therefore include consideration of the strength 
of the liberty interest, and it appears that in liberal societies, the right is 
substantial. Empirical analysis of the consequences of various behaviors 
under various regulatory regimes is necessary to inform decisions about 
the appropriate scope of criminalization and decriminalization of drugs, 
but the question of rights cannot be avoided.
COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL 
REGULATION OF DRUG USE
This section of the article is a composite drawn from a number of lead-
ing commentators. For those who oppose decriminalization, see Falco 
(1992), Jacobs (1990) and Wilson (1990). For those who propose decrimi-
nalization, see Nadelmann (1989), Husak (2002) and Global Commission 
on Drug Policy (2011). For non-partisan analyses that reach different con-
clusions, see Husak (1992), Kleiman (1992), MacCoun and Reuter (2001), 
Moore (1991) and Zimring and Hawkins (1992).
The outcome of criminal justice regulation of drug use will be inde-
terminate because many of the data are unavailable or unreliable, or 
fluctuate, and because the costs and benefits of an alternative regime 
are speculative. Also, historical and cross-cultural comparisons are 
of extremely limited value because social variables, which vary radi-
cally intertemporally within a society and across different societies, 
immensely affect the consequences of drug use and regulation. The rest 
of this section raises a number of issues, but readers should recognize 
that this is an intensely complicated issue and that this chapter can only 
touch on some of the considerations.
Harms from Drugs and the Benefits of Criminalization
Much debate about criminal regulation mistakes the probability and 
extent of the risks drugs pose. For example, most people who use most 
drugs recreationally do not become addicted and the moderate rec-
reational use of drugs is not per se dangerous if the drug is pure and 
properly consumed. Nonetheless, the ease of access to drugs following 
decriminalization would surely increase the prevalence of use, abuse 
and addiction, and their further harmful consequences. The harms might 
be especially great in poorer and minority communities, where the prev-
alence of drug use is no higher than in other communities, but where the 
effects have been more devastating. Some responsible observers believe 
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that decriminalization may effectively destroy poorer and minority com-
munities already ravaged by drug abuse and addiction.
The relation between drug addiction and other criminal activity and 
health harms is fraught because it is difficult to disentangle the effects 
of criminalization itself from the independent effects of drug use. Some 
drugs, especially if used heavily, can substantially impair judgment, 
facilitate impulsivity and have other effects that increase the risk of crim-
inal offending and other dangerous behavior, such as careless driving, 
sharing needles for intravenous injection and unprotected sex. Increased 
drug use, especially heavy use and addiction, will raise the rates of such 
undesirable behavior.
Criminalization of drugs inhibits use generally and consequent addic-
tion by making production, sale, possession and use more expensive and 
dangerous and by sending the clearest possible message that drug use is 
wrong. For example, there might have been both rights-based and con-
sequential reasons to repeal Prohibition in the USA, but the data suggest 
that consumption and addiction-related diseases such as cirrhosis of the 
liver both decreased when most alcohol production and sale were ille-
gal. Criminalization also helps to prevent drug use by minors. Although 
minors regrettably have access to and consume drugs in a regime of 
criminalization, ease of access generally would also increase use, as 
would potential addiction among minors who are already developmen-
tally predisposed to take unwarranted risks.
The use of criminal law to regulate drug use and addiction is obvi-
ously not fully successful by any standard and it is immensely expen-
sive, but the proponents of continued criminalization argue that 
the current regime provides greater benefits than costs and that the 
unknown benefits, if any, of decriminalization would pale in comparison 
to the costs of inevitably increased use and abuse.
The Costs of Criminalization
Criminal law enforcement, including imprisonment, is an especially 
intrusive and expensive form of regulation of any behavior. The cost– 
benefit critique of criminalization argues that such costs are not out-
weighed by the benefits because criminal law makes only a small dent in 
the use of drugs and because criminalization itself creates avoidable harms.
The attempt to eradicate drug use by criminal prohibition cannot fully 
succeed because large numbers of people want recreational drugs for 
the pleasure or relief they provide, and it is widely recognized that the 
dangers of drugs are sometimes exaggerated. Given the powerful factors 
that motivate the desire for drugs, the criminal sanction appears ineffec-
tive. The criminal justice system cannot prosecute and imprison more 
than a tiny fraction of the enormous numbers of people involved in the 
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illegal drug trade unless the justice system massively diverts resources 
from other, undisputed criminal law needs and abandons civil liberties 
protections. The criminal courts of the USA are already clogged with 
drug cases. It is hard to enforce laws that such large numbers of people 
wish to violate and that often have no immediate or complaining vic-
tim. Furthermore, public hypocrisy about drugs inevitably undermines 
law enforcement. Western society is not nearly as monolithically anti-
drug as many claim, as public policy toward ethanol and nicotine indi-
cates. Even spending vastly more money seemingly will provide only 
limited benefit. Fluctuations in drug usage appear far more related to 
major social, cultural and economic forces than to criminal law enforce-
ment. Despite billions spent on drug enforcement each year, undoubted 
law enforcement successes and the huge numbers of people in prison for 
drug-related offenses, drugs are still freely available, and in many cases 
increasingly stronger and cheaper. Of course, the latter observations are 
open to the interpretation that criminalization is succeeding and forcing 
dealers to offer better product more cheaply.
Criminalization also threatens its own effectiveness and creates other 
problems. For example, criminal prohibitions raise the price on a good 
or service: the so-called “crime tariff”. This ensures that there will be an 
endless supply of producers and dealers who seek to realize their prof-
its by any means necessary, including violence, and that many users, 
especially addicts, will be impoverished and driven to a life of further 
crime simply to support themselves and to obtain drugs. The immense 
profits facilitate the growth and power of domestic and international 
organized crime and can be used to corrupt law enforcement and politi-
cians. Criminalization decreases the probability that drug consumption 
will occur under conditions safest to health. Finally, primary emphasis 
on criminal law virtually ensures that fewer resources will be devoted 
to investigating and implementing less intrusive and potentially more 
effective means to reduce the prevalence of addiction and the other 
harms it causes.
The Benefits of Decriminalization
Specific decriminalization proposals would produce different ben-
efits, but the potential benefits of decriminalization are the opposites of 
the costs of criminalization. They include an increase in personal liberty; 
probable law enforcement cost savings; decrease in the crime, violence 
and corruption that criminalization produces; increased respect for law 
enforcement; and increased attention to possibly more effective means, 
such as education, treatment and civil regulation, to reduce use and con-
sequent addiction and its related harms. However, the relation between 
drug use and criminal activity is extremely complicated. For example, 
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drug use has not abated in recent years in the USA, but crime rates, 
especially violent crime rates, have fallen substantially. Nevertheless, 
criminalization produces a significant amount of criminal activity by def-
inition and as a consequence. In a regime of decriminalization, criminal 
law would be used only to prohibit particularly dangerous drug-related 
activities such as drugged-driving or selling to minors. Such traditional 
use of the criminal law would receive broad public support.
In the past few decades, there has been a vigorous debate in the 
USA and Western Europe about criminal law regulation of drug use. 
Decriminalization has become a “respectable” position. For example, a 
prestigious international group, the Global Commission on Drug Policy, 
has issued a report calling for decriminalization (2011). Some countries 
and localities have engaged in decriminalization experiments or regimes. 
Nonetheless, criminalization is still the dominant form of regulation and 
most countries spend far more on law enforcement aimed at prevent-
ing all drug use than they do on prevention and treatment programs for 
drug abuse prevention and treatment.
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND INVOLUNTARY 
CIVIL COMMITMENT
This section considers the criminal responsibility of addicts, diversion 
from the criminal justice system to specialized drug courts of addicts 
accused of non-violent crimes and involuntary civil commitment of 
addicts.
In Robinson v. California (1962), the US Supreme Court held that it was 
unconstitutional to convict and punish a person for being an addict. 
The rationale was that addiction is simply a status, and it is not fair to 
blame and punish people in the absence of a culpable act, a rationale 
that applies to attempted criminalization of any status. In Powell v. Texas 
(1968), the Supreme Court rejected a claim that, roughly, an alcoholic 
is constitutionally entitled to a “lack of control” defense to disorderly 
conduct in public as a result of alcoholism. In two later cases, the Court 
held that states may constitutionally bar defendants from introduc-
ing evidence of voluntary intoxication (Montana v. Egelhoff, 1996) and 
mental disorder (Clark v. Arizona, 2006) to negate the mental state cri-
teria required by the definitions of crimes (mens rea), criteria that the 
Constitution requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The Supreme Court has never held that the defense of legal insan-
ity is constitutionally required and it has upheld the constitutionality of 
the narrowest possible insanity defense (Clark v. Arizona, 2006). In sum, 
there are few constitutional limits on criminal responsibility and jurisdic-
tions are free to adopt virtually any responsibility doctrines they wish, 
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including those that may be more permissive than those the Supreme 
Court has approved.
Although proponents have suggested that there ought to be an inde-
pendent addiction defense to crime or that addiction should be a proper 
basis for an insanity defense, courts and legislatures faced with such 
claims have almost uniformly rejected them (e.g. United States v. Moore, 
1973). Moreover, control tests for legal insanity, which are usually con-
sidered the most natural claim for excuse based on addiction, have been 
exceedingly disfavored for many decades on the grounds that they are 
poorly conceptualized and operationalized. In the USA, there is no 
generic doctrine of mitigation available at trial that an addict might 
employ. At most, sentencing judges with discretion to consider addic-
tion for purposes of sentencing may do so, but addiction is a knife that 
cuts both ways. It may seem either to reduce or to enhance culpability 
depending on how addiction is viewed, and it may be a risk factor for 
dangerousness (Monahan et al., 2001).
The unforgiving response of US criminal law that denies or limits an 
excuse or mitigation for addiction may seem harsh, but there is justifica-
tion for it. The criteria for crimes always require action and actions can 
always be morally evaluated, even if an action is allegedly the sign or 
symptom of a disorder. The generic excusing conditions in US criminal 
law are lack of rational capacity and lack of control capacity. The ques-
tion is whether criminal behavior motivated in whole or in part by addic-
tion meets either condition. No criminal behavior, other than possession 
or use itself, is a sign or symptom of the “disease” of addiction. Even if it 
were, a genuine excusing condition, such as lack of rational capacity or 
lack of control capacity, would have to be independently demonstrated. 
Also, there is substantial dispute about whether addicts have diminished 
culpability for their criminal conduct on rationality or control grounds, 
especially for property crimes or crimes of violence that may be com-
mitted either to support an addict’s habit or as part of a general criminal 
lifestyle associated with addiction. (For recent treatments, compare Levy, 
2011, Morse, 2011, and Yaffe, 2011.) Moreover, addicts may be considered 
responsible for failing to take steps, such as entering treatment programs, 
that may prevent them from becoming less responsible. Finally, provid-
ing a defense to crime for addiction may establish perverse incentives 
that encourage drug use, and may increase addiction-related offending.
Given the disputes about the nature of addiction and the proper 
moral and legal response to it, limiting defenses based on addiction is 
not an irrational legislative or judicial judgment. The author’s view is 
that most addicts do not satisfy the excusing criteria and those who do 
may be held diachronously responsible based on an earlier failure to 
prevent their own condition of excuse. Nonetheless, even if addiction 
should not be a defense, sensible criminal justice reforms and other social 
V. PUBLIC POLICY AND LEGAL ISSUES
14. LEgAL REgULATION Of AddICTIvE SUbSTANCES ANd AddICTION274 
interventions involving drugs and addiction, to which the discussion 
will return in the next section, would be wise and just social policy.
Many US jurisdictions have established specialized drug courts to which 
addicts accused of non-violent crimes may be diverted in appropriate cases 
(see generally, Nolan, 2002). The details vary but, in essence, the diverted 
defendant must agree to treatment programs and to strict behavioral con-
trols. If the addict successfully completes the program, the criminal charge 
is typically dropped. If the addict fails, then prosecution resumes. These 
courts are controversial on empirical and normative grounds. It is not clear 
whether they are cost-effective in reducing recidivism and other harms 
associated with addiction and there are questions about whether they are 
sufficiently well-theorized and just (see Wild et al., this volume, Chapter 8).
Some jurisdictions permit traditional involuntary civil commitment 
of addicts, but others have special forms of commitment for substance 
abusers (Parry, 2010). The criteria and procedures for these two types of 
commitment may differ, which the Supreme Court has ruled does not 
necessarily offend equal protection if the jurisdiction has a justifiable 
rationale for distinguishing addicts (Heller v. Doe, 1993). In many cases, 
the criteria are similar, however, and require a finding that the substance 
abuser is a danger to self or others or is gravely disabled. There are no 
good data about how many people are civilly committed because they 
are addicts, but the number is not likely to be large. On the other hand, 
temporary protective custody for those who are incapacitated as a result 
of addiction or substance abuse is apparently common.
The justification for these commitments is that the addict is not 
responsible for being dangerous or gravely disabled, a rationale in some 
tension with the criminal law’s refusal to recognize non-responsibility 
based on substance abuse or addiction. Responsibility standards in the 
criminal and civil justice systems need not be the same because the two 
systems do not have the same goals. Nonetheless, criminal blame and 
punishment is the most severe infliction the state can impose on citizens 
and one would think the state would be more forgiving about responsi-
bility in such cases than in the case of a person who has committed no 
crime and would like to be at liberty. As argued in the next section, pro-
vision of adequate treatment in the community rather than involuntary 
civil commitment is the wiser course to deal with addiction.
LEGAL REFORMS TO MINIMIZE COSTS ASSOCIATED 
WITH ADDICTION
Even if the view is correct that most addicts most of the time can fairly 
be held responsible for the crimes they commit, including those such as 
buying and possessing controlled substances that are central criteria for 
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their disorder, it does not follow that the criminal justice policies our soci-
ety pursues toward addicts and other users is wise. Indeed, the author 
firmly believes that society should decriminalize purchase and possession 
for personal use and use itself (Morse, 2009). Political liberalism and pub-
lic health considerations suggest that criminal justice is not the optimum 
or even a sensible means to address these phenomena. Indeed, using 
criminal justice in such cases may be simply cruel. Moreover, doctrines 
of mitigation should be expanded to cover some cases when addicts com-
mit other crimes that are not a part of personal use itself (Morse, 2003). 
Vastly more treatment ought to be available to those addicts who would 
benefit, including reducing their risk of criminal behavior. This would be 
cost-effective in itself and certainly more cost-effective and less liberty 
depriving than involuntary civil commitment. Further, it would not be 
unconstitutional or unwise to make entering a treatment program a con-
dition for probation or parole or for more lenient conditions in prison. If 
these and similar policies were adopted, it is likely that the personal and 
social costs of addiction and substance abuse would decrease markedly 
and criminal justice would operate more fairly.
CONCLUSION
Whether and how potentially addictive substances should be legally 
regulated, especially by criminal law, are complicated, fraught questions 
that involve considerations of individual rights and issues of public health 
and welfare. Whether addiction should be a defense to crime and whether 
addicts should be subject to involuntary civil commitment are equally diffi-
cult issues. Many debatable and reasonable choices for public policy are pos-
sible, but some reforms would do much to ease the burdens on individuals 
and communities that current criminal and civil law regulation impose.
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